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HIDING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: MYTHS
AND REALITIES
By Pat K. Chew*
The percent of Americans viewing sexual harassment as a major problem
actually decreased between 2017 and 2019, with only 53% of men considering it
a major problem in 2019 compared to 66% in 2017.1
“Each time that I was taking it, again and again, it just felt like more of me
diminishing . . . until [I] was just like a shell of a person.”2
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INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment and gender disparities in the workplace continue, but
we are not paying enough attention.3 The heralded me-too movement and the
publicized downfalls of Harvey Weinstein, Bill Cosby, and other former luminaries4 might give the impression that the lid is blown off the indignities of harassment in the workplace and that American society’s collective disdain and
abhorrence of harassment has quickly put an end to these incivilities. But these
headline cases are just the tip of the sexual harassment iceberg; they may even
give us a false sense of security and optimism.
The truth is that we are not yet in that post-harassment, post-sexist era. By
not candidly recognizing that and taking affirmative corrective measures, we
are letting harassers and their employers get away with harassment and continue to hurt women in the workplace.

3

I am aware and recognize that “sex discrimination” and “sexual harassment” have been
defined in very specific ways under Title VII caselaw. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–92
(1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–54 (1998). I am using the terms
“sex discrimination” and “sexual harassment” in this Article, however, in a more interdisciplinary and plain-language way to encompass women being perceived and treated differently
and disadvantageously in the workplace because of their sex and gender. These disparate
attitudes and treatment may be revealed in the form of specific employment decisions (as in
hiring and promotion) but also may occur in day-to-day experiences. See, e.g., RACHEL
THOMAS ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2019, at 11 (2019) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT 2019]. Later in the Article, for instance, I explain how the legal definition of sexual harassment has been too narrow and consequently ineffective in addressing
sexual harassment in reality. See infra text accompanying notes 189-193.
4
See, e.g., Orion Rummler, Global #MeToo Movement Resulted in 7 Convictions, 5 Charges of Influential Figures, AXIOS (July 3, 2020), https://www.axios.com/global-metoomovement-convictions-charges-382ff226-7ad3-4b26-ac89-451788192578.html [perma.cc/F
M66-YJKV].
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This Article explores three related myths on which sexual harassment is
built and allowed to continue. These myths perpetuate what we would like to
believe about sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and what happens to
women who complain about sexual harassment and their alleged harassers. Part
I discusses the myth that gender inequality and sex discrimination are no longer
prevalent. It continues by exploring the stories we tell ourselves and others to
keep that myth alive. Part II discusses the myth that sexual harassment is no
longer prevalent. It continues by revealing that sexual harassment very much
continues and that it is intrinsically related to sex discrimination. Part III explores the myth that there is a just resolution for the courageous women who
are harassed and then report it—that the men and employers responsible are
identified and punished. This Article reveals instead that harassed employees
are disadvantaged at every stage of the reporting and resolution process, often
leading to their frustration and failure.
This Article hopes to inspire conversation on these three myths and their
contrary realities. By recognizing these truths, we can begin to take actions toward transforming those idealistic myths into actual realities. The Article ends
in the Conclusion with proposals for achieving that future goal.
I.

MYTH: SEX DISCRIMINATION IS NO LONGER PREVALENT

Many think gender inequality and sex discrimination in the workplace are
no longer prevalent.
The Pew Research Center, for example, reports only 26% of Americans
view sexism as a “big problem” with only 35% viewing it as small and 29% as
not a problem at all.5 Or stated in the inverse, about three-quarters of Americans buy into the myth that women do not face everyday sex discrimination. In
another survey, many respondents indicate a similar sentiment. Men in particular believe that the country has done enough or even gone too far on gender
equality, with 57% sharing that view.6
A.

Sex Discrimination Persists

The occasional news about a high-profile female chief executive7 might
suggest that the workplace is now a place of equal opportunity, the glass ceiling
5

In a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/in-a-politically-polarizedera-sharp-divides-in-both-partisan-coalitions/ [perma.cc/23LF-XQWK].
6
John Gramlich, 10 Things We Learned About Gender Issues in the U.S. in 2017, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/28/10-thingswe-learned-about-gender-issues-in-the-u-s-in-2017/ [perma.cc/WP9E-E8LS]. Even 41% of
women agreed. Id. 72% of Republicans agreed, in contrast to 30% of Democrats. Id. Specific
inquiry: When it comes to giving equal rights with men, the country “has gone too far,” “has
been about right,” or “hasn’t gone far enough.” Id.
7
Emma Hinchliffe, The Number of Female CEOs in the Fortune 500 Hits an All-time Record, FORTUNE (May 18, 2020, 4:15 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/05/18/women-ceos-
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is no-more, and the pipeline to positions of workplace leadership is as available
to women as to men. Wrong. While progress has been made, widespread gender discrepancies in rewards and treatment persist and, in fact, remain pervasive in many places in today’s workplace.8 The Pew Research Center, for example, found that 42% of women indicate they have experienced gender
discrimination at work.9 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) also reports that in 2019, there were 23,532 sex-based discrimination
charges.10
While sex discrimination is manifested in various ways, we briefly note
three forms.11 First are pay gaps between women and men, second are disparate
career patterns and underrepresentation across many industries and jobs, and
third are microaggressions that are disproportionally directed at women.
Earning inequality, as exemplified by pay gaps, is a commonly reported
form of discrimination.12 Twenty-five percent of women say they earn less than
fortune-500-2020 [perma.cc/YV44-LYZR] (but noting that 37 of 500 is only 7.4%); Sharon
Terlep, Clorox, with Its Sales Soaring from the Coronavirus, to Get New CEO, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 3, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/clorox-posts-higher-sales-asconsumers-stock-up-on-disinfectants-11596454128 [https://perma.cc/8AVQ-86EB] (indicating only 5% of CEO’s at 500 largest companies are women).
8
See, e.g., MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 7–8, 10–11; LAUREN PASQUARELLA
DALEY, CATALYST, WOMEN AND THE FUTURE OF WORK 2–4 (2019); Stephen Turban et al., A
Study Used Sensors to Show that Men and Women Are Treated Differently at Work, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/a-study-used-sensors-to-show-that-menand-women-are-treated-differently-at-work [perma.cc/B2AQ-3494]; Jessica M. Salerno et
al., Closing with Emotion: The Differential Impact of Male Versus Female Attorneys Expressing Anger in Court, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 385 (2018); Byrd Pinkerton, He’s
Brilliant, She’s Lovely: Teaching Computers to Be Less Sexist, NPR (Aug. 12, 2016, 8:01
AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/12/489507182/hes-brilliant-sh
es-lovely-teaching-computers-to-be-less-sexist [perma.cc/35Q3-874G]; see also Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment: Quick Take, CATALYST (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.cat
alyst.org/research/sex-discrimination-and-sexual-harassment/ [perma.cc/V4E8-SVW8]. Research in certain occupations, such as for economists, has been particularly extensive. David
Harrison, Female Economists, in Survey, Cite Gender Discrimination; Results Come as the
Profession’s Treatment of Women Has Come Under Focus, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2019,
2:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/female-economists-in-survey-citegender-discrimina
tion-11552923797 [perma.cc/LU6T-KJ9D]; Colleen Flaherty, Anonymous Comments, Unmasked Bias, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/201
7/08/21/internet-can-be-brutal-place-women-economics-paper-finds [perma.cc/7PD9-EZZ
Z]; Colleen Flaherty, Belief in Gender Bias and Promotions for Women, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Aug. 27, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/08/27/beliefgender-bias-and-promotions-women [perma.cc/JVG3-ALGW].
9
Gramlich, supra note 6 (compared to 20% of men who said the same).
10
Press Release, U.S. EEOC, EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 2019 Enforcement and Litigation
Data (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-fiscal-year-2019-enforc
ement-and-litigation-data [perma.cc/WWB4-X77F] (includes both sexual harassment and
other sex-based claims such as sex discrimination and retaliation).
11
See discussion in notes 12–42 and accompanying text.
12
The State of the Gender Pay Gap in 2020, PAYSCALE [hereinafter PayScale Report]
https://www.payscale.com/data/gender-pay-gap [perma.cc/HH8Y-GJJJ]; see also Claire
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a man doing the same job while just 5% thought they earned less than women
doing the same job.13 A well-documented actual pay gap between men and
women continues. Women make only 81 cents for every dollar men make in
2020.14 “[T]he gender pay gap is wider for women of color, women in executive level roles, women in certain occupations and industries, and in
some . . . states.”15
The impact of these lost wages on lifetime earnings can be significant with
hundreds of thousands of dollars and an improved standard of living at stake.16
Researchers predict that women in general will lose $900,000 on average over
a lifetime.17 Furthermore, the researchers conclude that the gender wage gap
cannot be fully explained by differences in education, experience, occupation,
and personal decisions. “[W]omen are still being paid less than men due to no
attributable reason other than gender.”18
As a PayScale study describes:
Women are paid less relative to men for every occupation . . . . [W]omen
make up the majority of the workforce in support, service, and wellbeing-related
occupations such as community & social services, education, training & library,
healthcare practitioners, healthcare support, office and administrative support,
and personal care & services.
Although it might stand to reason that the gender wage gap would be smaller
in occupations where women dominate, the data showed no such pattern. For
example, women dominate in the legal industry, which is 53 percent women and
47 percent men. However, legal had the largest gender wage gap in the study,
Cain Miller, As Women Take over a Male-Dominated Field, the Pay Drops, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/upshot/as-women-take-over-a-maledominated-field-the-pay-drops.html [https://perma.cc/9W3J-V8JY]; Jen Hubley Luckwaldt,
When an Occupation Becomes Female-Dominated, Pay Declines, PAYSCALE (Mar. 21,
2016), https://www.payscale.com/career-news/2016/03/when-an-occupation-becomes-femal
e-dominated-pay-declines [perma.cc/6VWL-4JAU]; Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn,
The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 789, 789
(2017) (“[T]he gender pay gap decline[s] much more slowly at the top of the wage distribution than at the middle or [the] bottom . . . . [T]raditional explanations [for a gender pay gap]
continue to have salience. . . . Gender differences in occupations and industries, as well as
differences in gender roles and the gender division of labor remain important, and research
based on experimental evidence strongly suggests that discrimination cannot be discounted.
Psychological attributes or noncognitive skills comprise one of the newer explanations for
gender differences in outcomes. Our effort to assess the quantitative evidence on the importance of these factors suggests that they account for a small to moderate portion of the
gender pay gap, considerably smaller than, say, occupation and industry effects, though they
appear to modestly contribute to these differences.”).
13
PayScale Report, supra note 12.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. When taking into account all kinds of variables (controlled group), the lost earnings
are less at $80,000. Id. However, given lost investment income from those incremental earnings over forty years, that gap is significant. Id.
18
Id.
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suggesting that women and men don’t have the same jobs levels or titles within
the legal profession statistically.19

The pay gap is greater in some industries, such as finance and insurance.20
And even what sounds like good news in other industries needs to be studied
more carefully. When controlling for many factors—for instance in technology
and engineering and science—pay equity appears to be achieved.21 “However,
there is a large difference between the controlled and uncontrolled gender pay
gaps in these sectors.”22 “Among other things, this is indicative of women and
men not having the same job levels or job titles.”23
A second example of evidence of sex discrimination is the different career
patterns and underrepresentation of women in many settings. While there are
select examples of women in all kinds of leadership roles,24 the bigger picture
reveals ongoing gender underrepresentation all along the workplace pipeline
and patterns of bias. For example, in addition to the issues in pay equity in the
technology, engineering, and science industries described above, women make
up only 29% of the tech industry and 38% of engineering and science workers.25
A large-scale multi-year research project by McKinsey Consultants
(McKinsey Report) illustrates the gender disparities across many settings and
across time.26 Their research is based on a survey of hundreds of companies in
the private, public, and social sectors.27 Thousands of employees are included.28
Among other findings in their 2018 report are the following:
Based on four years of data from 462 companies employing almost 20 million people, including the 279 companies participating in this year’s study, two
19

Id. (“Education, training & library occupations have [a large] uncontrolled pay gap, despite that women make up the vast majority of educators. Women in these jobs earn $0.72
for every dollar earned by men, even though 74 percent . . . are women. Although women
represent a larger portion of this sector’s workforce, many teach primary education. Most
men . . . teach secondary education, where head coaching and administrative duties are more
available than in elementary school settings. Such leadership opportunities [can then lead to]
administrative roles with higher salaries. These disparities are compounded when taken with
the harmful stereotypes that women are poor leaders or bad with finances, two pejoratives
that thicken the glass ceiling.”).
20
Id. (“Finance & insurance has the largest uncontrolled wage gap ($0.76), followed by
agencies & consultancies ($0.81), healthcare ($0.83), retail & customer service ($0.83), and
transportation & warehousing ($0.84). Industries with the smallest uncontrolled wage gaps
include arts, entertainment & recreation ($0.93) and real estate & rental/leasing ($0.92).”).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See CATALYST, WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP AT S&P/ TSX COMPANIES 3 (2020).
25
PayScale Report, supra note 12; see also MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 46
(noting pay gaps when women enter higher paying occupations).
26
MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 69 (noting many gender disparities in compensation and other rewards across many industries and professions are documented).
27
Id. at 68.
28
Id. at 1.
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things are clear: [one,] [w]omen remain significantly underrepresented, particularly women of color. [Two,] [c]ompanies need to change the way they hire and
promote entry- and manager-level employees to make real progress.
Since 2015, the first year of this study, corporate America has made almost
no progress in improving women’s representation. Women are underrepresented
at every level, and women of color are the most underrepresented group of all,
lagging behind white men, men of color, and white women. 29

Their evidence further reveals that obstacles to success appear quickly in
women’s careers. The data shows a “broken rung” in the promotion ladder,
where women are not promoted as much as men from entry level to first-level
management.30 For every 100 men promoted, only 72 women are promoted.31
Not surprising given this broken rung, men hold 62% of all manager-level positions (including more senior levels) and women hold only 38%.32 There is some
progress in leadership roles, but still underrepresentation. Only one in five Csuite executives is a woman; only one in twenty-five is a woman of color.33
The McKinsey Report 2018 study also found that attrition is not the explanation for underrepresentation.34 The same percentage of men and women leave
their companies (about 15% annually).35 When they leave their current employer, the same percent of women and men stay in the workforce (81–82%) and
only a small percent of women (2%) leave to focus on family.36
A third type of often underreported sex discrimination is microaggressions
disproportionately directed at women workers. Microaggressions are everyday
slights that may appear small when isolated but indicate patterns of inequality
over time.37 As the McKinsey Report indicates, women report that they are
more likely than men to be subjected to an array of microaggressions at work.38
They include others questioning their competence, being overlooked, and being
disrespected.39 How are these microaggressions manifested and measured? As
further delineated below, women’s competence is questioned in the following
ways: they need to provide more evidence of their competence, or they have
their judgment questioned in their areas of expertise.40 Women are overlooked
29

RACHEL THOMAS ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 2018, at 5–6
(2018) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT 2018].
30
MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 12–14.
31
Id. at 10–11.
32
Id. at 11; see also Vanessa Fuhrmans, Where Women Fall Behind at Work: The First Step
into Management, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2019, 12:18 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wh
ere-women-fall-behind-at-work-the-first-step-into-management-11571112361 [perma.cc/DD
M3-DKFC].
33
MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 9.
34
MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 7.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 48.
38
Id. at 48–49.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 49.

21 NEV. L.J. 1223

1230

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

when interrupted, spoken over, or denied credit for their ideas.41 Women are
disrespected by being mistaken for someone at a lower level, by demeaning
remarks about them or people like them, by others’ surprise at their language
skills, or by feeling like they cannot talk about themselves or their lives outside
of work.42
HOW WOMEN EXPERIENCE MICROAGGRESSIONS DISPROPORTIONATELY43
Women’s Competence Questioned
• More evidence of their competence required (30% of women versus 14% of men)
• Judgment questioned in their area of expertise (38% of women versus 29% of men)
Women Overlooked
• Interrupted or spoken over (50% of women versus 34% of men),
• Not getting credit for their ideas (38% of women versus 27% of men)
Women Disrespected
• Mistaken for someone at a lower level (18% of women versus 9% of men)
• Demeaning remarks (16% of women versus 11% of men)
• Surprise at their language skills (14% of women versus 8% of men)
• Feeling like they cannot talk about themselves (10% of women versus 7% of men)

The McKinsey Report also reveals that certain groups of women describe
more microaggressions than women in general. Lesbian women, bisexual
women, and women with disabilities are more likely to have their competence
questioned, be overlooked, or be disrespected.44 For example, 46% of bisexual
women need to provide more evidence of their competence (in contrast to 14%
of men); 64% of bisexual women are interrupted or spoken over (in contrast to
34% of men).45 Forty percent of Black women are more likely to have their
competence questioned and are disrespected (in contrast to 30% of women in
general and 14% of men).46 Women who are alone in their workplace also suffer microaggressions disproportionately.47 They are more likely than women
who are not the only woman in their workplace to have their competence questioned (49% to 51% versus 20 to 30% of women who are not alone), and more
likely to be overlooked (52% to 68% versus 29% to 40% of women who are
not alone).48
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 52.
48
Id. at 53. Of more than 9,000 respondents in an American Economic Survey, about twothirds of female economists believe their work is not taken as seriously as the work of male
economists. See Harrison, supra note 8. Their beliefs are supported by research showing that
postings on an anonymous discussion board for economics students describe women’s physical characteristics rather than the merits of their work, in contrast to a more predictable dis42
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B. Why Do We Believe Otherwise?
Given the clear empirical evidence of sex discrimination—as illustrated
above by compensation disparities, underrepresentation and pipeline problems,
and disproportionate microaggressions—how are we able to deny these gender
disparities? How can the reality of sex discrimination be supplanted with the
mistaken belief that sex discrimination is no longer prevalent? We are able to
do this in part by telling ourselves “stories” that rationalize what is really happening.49
Sociologist Arianne Renan Barzilay proposes that men, and to some extent
women, accept gendered treatment because it is consistent with broader societal
views.50 She posits that we learn these inequities and tolerate them without
even thinking about it.51 I suggest that we capture these societal views in the
stories we tell about the way the world functions. I discuss, for instance, two
rationalizing stories that allow us to ignore sex discrimination in the workplace.
The first is the story that there are natural and appropriate roles for women and
men that justify discrimination in the workplace; the second story is that it is
just a matter of time for women to achieve parity and that it is largely up to
women to do so.
1. Narrative: The Ideal Man, the Ideal Woman, and the Ideal Worker
Could it be that sex discrimination is explained in part by American society’s belief that there are natural and therefore appropriate male and female
roles? Furthermore, do these gendered roles result in discrimination in the
workplace?
Barzilay proposes that we have idealized versions of gender roles, what I
label as the “ideal woman” and the “ideal man”.52 At the same time, we also
have an idealized version of an “ideal worker” who has characteristics we associate with committed and desirable workers who deserve success and job rewards.53 Society’s image of the “ideal worker” is an employee who is totally
devoted to their job and their bosses’ and employers’ business goals.54 They do
not have distracting family and household duties and obligations.55
cussion of the merits of men’s work. Id. Another study show that female economists have a
harder time than men in placing their work in professional journals. Id.
49
See, e.g., David Robson, The Sexist Myths That Won’t Die, BBC (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190930-the-sexist-myths-about-gender-stereotypesthat-wont-die [perma.cc/GP8K-P6GC].
50
Arianne Renan Barzilay, Discrimination Without Discriminating? Learned Gender Inequality in the Labor Market and Gig Economy, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 545, 554,
557, 563 (2019).
51
Id. at 554.
52
Id. at 558–59.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 558.
55
Id.

21 NEV. L.J. 1223

1232

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

Conveniently, this ideal worker is consistent with the description of the
ideal man who takes care of himself and his family financially by working very
hard for his company, factory, or institution.56 Embedded in many ways in
American society, an ideal man proves his masculinity through his “macho”
image of protecting women and children57 and bringing home the essential resources to help his family survive. A man’s workplace, consistent with the natural order of gender roles, is to work outside the home.
In contrast, the ideal woman incorporates the motherhood myth that women are best suited and naturally disposed toward parenting and nurturing the
family as a whole. Thus, ideally for society’s sake, a woman should responsibly
stay home and take care of raising the children and creating a loving and appropriately supportive home environment.58
Motherhood myths include the assumptions that women, by their very nature,
are endowed with parenting abilities, that at-home mothers are bonded to their
children, providing them with unrivalled nurturing surroundings. Conversely,
motherhood myths pathologised alternative mothering models, depicting employed mothers as neglecting their duty of caring, threatening the family relationships and jeopardizing mother-children bondings.59

This tension between being an ideal woman and an ideal worker unconsciously disadvantages women in the workplace. Perhaps employers’ and colleagues’ sex discrimination, manifested for instance in their microaggressions
and workplace decisions, is an unconscious way for them to lash out at women
who they think really should not be working at all or at least not so ambitiously.
Comparative research, for instance, suggests that women and men across
many countries use motherhood myths to justify sex discrimination in the
workplace.60 This research further reveals that countries who adhere most to the
motherhood myth area also more likely to have other indices of sex discrimination.61
2. Narrative: It’s Just a Matter of Time
My observations are that those who believe that sex discrimination is not a
real problem are also comforted by the mantra “It’s just a matter of time.” They
rationalize that a few “things” just have to fall in place, and that they will over
time.62 Further, they imagine that the amount and timing of gender progress is

56

Id. at 558–59.
See, e.g., KRISTIN KOBES DU MEZ, JESUS AND JOHN WAYNE: HOW WHITE EVANGELICALS
CORRUPTED A FAITH AND FRACTURED A NATION 76, 84, 91 (2020).
58
Catherine Verniers & Jorge Vala, Justifying Gender Discrimination in the Workplace:
The Mediating Role of Motherhood Myths, 13 PLOS ONE, Jan. 2018, at 3, 14, 16, 18.
59
Id. at 3 (internal citations omitted).
60
Id. at 14.
61
Id. at 14, 16.
62
Id. at 2.
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largely under the control of women.63 Hence, to the extent there are any gender
differences in the workplace, they are attributable to women’s efforts and
choices.64
Thus, when faced with the reality of women’s pay gap or their lags in advancement, a common story is that women simply lack the necessary job skills
and conduct. Men, the reasoning goes, have mastered the necessary job skills
and conduct that lead to their success. Specifically, men have mentors, have
contact with company leaders, and are active in their communications and social networks.65 Women, on the other hand, lack mentoring relationships and
the necessary networking skills.66 Once women behave appropriately (e.g.,
have mentors and network), they too will be successful. “It’s just a matter of
time.”
Stephen Turban and his colleagues deconstruct this story and its assumptions.67 They conducted an extensive case study of a large American company
where women are not getting promoted.68 They researched whether men and
women do in fact have different skills and behave differently.69 Their extensive
case study is of a large multinational firm where women were 35–40% of the
entry-level employees but only 20% of those in upper management.70 Women
were not advancing.71
Turban’s research methodology was to use sophisticated monitoring devices to track email communications and meetings, and also to meticulously track
employees in-person behavior throughout their workday.72 Using sociometric
sensors that measure speech patterns and employees’ movement, they were
able to determine who talks with whom, where and when people communicate,
and who dominates conversations.73

63

See MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 8, 13, 17 (evidencing the many ways that
gender progress is not under the control of women).
64
See, e.g., MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 4, 7, 9, 32–34, 58, 60. Sex discrimination is not attributable to women’s choices in the McKinsey Report. Id. at 4, 7, 34. Contrary to a common belief that that women do not have the same salaries because they simply do
not ask for better pay, the evidence here is that they do ask for better salaries. Id. In addition,
the report indicates that women do not leave jobs for family reasons any more than men do.
Id. The MCKINSEY REPORT 2018 also discusses at length the many external workplace barriers to gender progress. Pages 10–15 offer a summary, for instance, of the way that women
get less support than men from managers in providing necessary resources, help with navigating organizational politics, etc. Id. at 10–15.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Turban, supra note 8.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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The researchers found no perceptible differences in men and women’s
conduct regarding mentors, networking, and communication patterns.74 Both
groups had the same number of contacts and time with senior leadership.75 Men
and women even had the same performance evaluations.76 Turban and his colleagues’ explanation for their findings is straightforward: the gender inequality
that shows up in women’s lack of promotion is attributable to management bias, not to differences in women’s behavior.77 Women are perceived and treated
differently; the same behavior and performance do not reap the same rewards
as for men.
Jessica Salerno and her colleagues research on lawyers78 also is contrary to
the story that “it’s just a matter of time.” The accompanying narratives are that
women are still comparatively new to their jobs and careers, they still have insufficient skills and have not learned the conduct necessary for success, and
that this skills-building are things that women can fix if they want.79
In Salerno’s study, participants view videos of a male or a female attorney
giving the same closing statement in a murder case, either in a calm tone or in
an angry one.80 While attorneys are ordinarily expected to be calm and rational,
trial attorneys are trained to be emotional in the courtroom when telling their
“narrative” to the jurors. Prosecuting attorneys, for instance, “delivering a closing statement in a case involving a mother who was murdered in heinous manner in front of her infant child” are expected and trained to be emotional.81
Their anger is professionally appropriate, anticipated, and endorsed as a way to
convince jurors of the defendant’s brutal and outrageous act.
Asked to evaluate the attorney’s effectiveness, the participants’ assessment
of male and female attorneys differ.82 Male lawyers’ anger is more likely to be
described as commanding, powerful, and competent; and participants are more
likely to hire them for their effectiveness.83 Female lawyers’ anger, in contrast,
are more likely described as shrill, hysterical, and grating; and participants are
more likely to consider them ineffective and not hire them.84 In other words,
angry male litigators who were exhibiting professionally appropriate behavior
and skills under the circumstances are perceived positively. Angry female litigators, also exhibiting professionally appropriate behavior and skills were per74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Salerno, supra note 8, at 388.
79
See, e.g., MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 11 (illustrating lack of management
support for women’s success), 29 (noting that women do ask for higher salaries and promotions).
80
Salerno, supra note 8 at 388.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 390.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 394.
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ceived negatively.85 Also striking, both male and female participants evaluated
the attorneys in these gender-biased ways.86
In other words, the Salerno study results document that women lawyers are
still discriminated against even though they demonstrate the appropriate professional skills. Others’ negative assessment of them is not attributable to women
lawyers’ building the necessary skills and adapting the appropriate professional
conduct. It is not just a matter of their time.
In summary, despite the societal myth that sex discrimination is no longer
prevalent, the empirical evidence confirms otherwise. One way we perpetuate
this myth is the underlying stories we tell—such as the ones about the disconnect between the ideal woman and the ideal worker, and the false narratives
that progress is inevitable and any lack of progress is attributable to women
themselves. Further, as we discuss below, the ongoing prevalence of sex discrimination is related to sexual harassment.
II. MYTH: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS NO LONGER PREVALENT
A. Sexual Harassment and Sex Discrimination
As with sex discrimination, many do not believe that sexual harassment
continues to be widespread. According to a Gallup poll, the percentage of
Americans viewing sexual harassment as a major problem actually decreased
between 2017 and 2019, with only 53% of men considering it a major problem
in 2019 compared to 66% in 2017.87
Empirical research, however, indicates a different reality about the prevalence of sexual harassment. A large-scale government study (Feldblum Report)88 reveals a staggering 60% of female workers in all kinds of settings report some form of gender harassment.89 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) statistics also are telling. Last year, 12,739 employee
charges of sex-based harassment were filed with the EEOC.90 Further, the
McKinsey Report based on a survey of organizational settings, finds that two in
five women in their careers have experienced sexual harassment—including
being touched in inappropriately sexual ways, receiving unwanted attempts to
85

Id. at 394.
Id. at 397.
87
Brenan, supra note 1 (increasing concerns for accused men and backlash from me-too).
88
CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE
STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/select-task-forcestudy-harassment-workplace [perma.cc/FN98-TVRZ] (definition of gender harassment;
sampling techniques); see also Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment: Quick Take, supra note 8.
89
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88.
90
Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010 - FY 2019,
U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charges-alleging-sex-based-harassment-chargesfiled-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2019 [perma.cc/LU58-LQ5R].
86
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have an intimate relationship, and hearing sexist jokes.91 Some groups are particularly likely to report harassment: lesbian women, bisexual women, women
with disabilities, and women in technical roles.92 More detailed research in certain professional areas, such as one on the legal profession,93 offer a detailed
expose of sexual harassment in a particular setting. And considering that an estimated 90% of those who are harassed do not publicly complain, all these statistics grossly underestimate actual sexual harassment.94
As the McKinsey Report illustrates, sexual harassment includes many
forms of conduct.95 At one extreme, it includes unwanted sexual advances, sexual assault, and rape. But it also includes “hostile behavior, physical assault,
patronizing treatment, personal ridicule, social ostracism, exclusion or marginalization, denial of information, and work sabotage.”96 What all these forms of
conduct have in common are that women are being targeted in these disadvantaged and unwanted ways because of their sex or sexual orientation. The result
is a work culture that is hostile to women because they are women.
Not realizing that sexual harassment continues to be prevalent is not the
only thing we do not acknowledge. We also view sex discrimination and sexual
harassment as very different phenomena. We believe that sexual harassment is
driven specifically by sexual attraction and desire while sex discrimination is a
much broader phenomenon predicated on fundamental beliefs such as those described in Part I.97 But sex discrimination and sexual harassment actually have
a common basis.

91

MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 50.
Id. (table: 53% of lesbian women, 62% of bisexual women, 51% of women with disabilities, 48% of women in technical roles, and senior level women 59%).
93
An extensive empirical study of the legal profession found the following:
92

[1.] The [e]xtent and [b]readth of [m]isconduct/[h]arassment [a]re [i]nsidious and [a]larming[.
. . . 2.] Reporting [s]ystems [i]ntended to [d]iscourage and [c]apture [h]arassing [i]ncidents [a]re
[m]ostly [n]ot [w]orking[. . . 3.] Most [h]arassers [f]ace [f]ew or [n]o [a]dverse
[c]onsequences[. . . . 4.] The “[p]rice” [t]hat [w]omen, in [p]articular, [p]ay and the [c]ost to
[o]rganizations and the [p]rofession [a]re [c]onsiderable[. . . . 5.] People at [e]very [l]evel—
[i]ncluding [w]omen in [p]owerful [p]ositions—[a]re [b]eing [h]arassed[. . . . 6.] Age,
[r]ace/[e]thnicity and [g]ender [i]dentity [a]re [p]erceived as [c]ompounding [d]imensions.

WOMEN LAWYERS ON GUARD INC., STILL BROKEN: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND MISCONDUCT
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 6, 8, 19–22 (2020).
94
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88 (EEOC statistics would predict over 190,000 workers
who feel harassed). Sexual harassment is not limited to workplaces. For instance, there is
increased recognition of sexual harassment and assault on college campuses. See, e.g.,
Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125
YALE L.J. 1940, 1969 (2016); Jonathan Broder, Title IX and Campus Sexual Assault, 29 CQ
RESEARCHER 1, 4–5, 15 (2020).
95
MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 48, 50.
96
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. F. 22, 27
(2018) [hereinafter Schultz 2018].
97
See supra notes 49-61.
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As Vicki Shultz proposes in her pioneering work,98 sexual domination and
exploitation may not be the only or even the primary motivation for sexual harassment. Men instead sexually harass women because of their “drive to maintain the most highly rewarded forms of works as domains of masculine competence.”99 Harassment’s purpose is to denigrate women’s competence so they are
seen as inferior and less capable workers, and therefore prevented from maledominated jobs.100
Shultz bluntly states: “Sexual harassment has always been more about sexism than it is about sex.”101 It bolsters an idealized masculine work identity and
status,102 and is consistent with a broader workplace culture of viewing and
treating women in professionally demeaning and devaluing ways:103
Motivated by both material considerations and equally powerful psychological
ones, harassment provides a means for men to mark their jobs as male territory
and to discourage any women who seek to enter. By keeping women in their
place in the workplace, men secure superior status in the home, in the polity, and
in the larger culture as well.104

Furthermore, it takes only a few men, particularly if the supervisor acquiesces, to create a hostile environment for any women daring to upset the “natural order” of gender segregation.105 For women who hold nontraditional jobs,
harassment exaggerates gender differences to remind them they are out of place
for a man’s world. As Brazilay reminds us, the “ideal man” is traditionally
viewed as the breadwinner with mastery of uniquely masculine competencies.106 When the presence of women threatens their status, men use harassment
as a means to reinforce gender differences and protect their masculine-

98

Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1755 (1998)
[hereinafter Schultz 1998]; Schultz 2018, supra note 96, at 27 (2018).
99
Schultz 1998, supra note 98, at 1755. Schultz also describes a “competence-centered”
paradigm. Id. Harassment is used “as a means [for men] to reclaim favored lines of work and
work competence as masculine-identified turf—in the face of a threat posed by the presence
of women (or lesser men) who seek to claim these prerogatives as their own.” Id. She notes
all kinds of ways that women are denigrated and demeaned. Id. at 1763–66.
100
Id. at 1762.
101
Schultz 2018, supra note 96, at 22.
102
Id. at 24.
103
Schultz 1998, supra note 98, at 1762–63.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1759 (internal quotations omitted).
106
Barzilay, supra note 50, at 558, 563; see also THE ASSISTANT (Bleecker Street Media
2020) (a film depicting how harassment can become an unspoken part of workplace culture);
Justin Chang, ‘The Assistant’ Helps Explain How Predatory Behavior Stays Hidden, NPR
(Jan. 28, 2020, 1:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/28/800408643/the-assistant-helpsexplain-how-predatory-behavior-stays-hidden [perma.cc/3S4X-9798]. Surveys of economists illustrate, for instance, an interactive relationship: female economists face professional
denigration in various ways and report being victims of attempted or actual sexual assaults
or touched in ways that make them feel uncomfortable. See Blau & Kahn, supra note 12, at
836–37; Harrison, supra note 8.
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identified turf. Sexual harassment is about control and power rather than sexual
desire.107
Moreover, studies show that sexual harassment is more likely in settings
that evidence gender disparities more generally. For example, women are particularly susceptible to harassment in workplaces that are homogeneously male;
and where men are significantly over-represented relative to women.108 Men
dominate in technology related industries and energy related industries, with
significant female underrepresentation throughout the pipeline from the entry
level on.109 A worker who is the only woman in a group, such as a team, department, or location also is more susceptible. Those in the minority or alone
can feel isolated and vulnerable; and those who are in the majority might feel
threatened or uncomfortable around those not like them.110
Sexual harassment is also more probable in settings with power disparities,
such as when workers hold positions with less status, authority, and compensation.111 Examples are employees holding positions subject to others’ direction,
such as administrative support staff, nurses and other allied health professionals, maintenance personnel, and entry level positions. When men have the decision-making power, they may feel emboldened to exploit low-ranking employees who may feel they have no choice and also do not understand their rights.112
Shultz relates these two risk factors of homogenous workplaces and power
disparities in her discussion of “sex segregation,” that is, workplaces where
men have jobs with the most power and status while women hold lower-status
positions:113
This state of affairs fosters sex stereotypes—for example, a sense that men are
leaders or geniuses while women are followers, . . . prompting the dominant
group to perceive any minorities who enter their jobs as “different” and out of
place, and to close ranks against them to defend . . . their superior workplace positions and associated masculinities . . . .”114

The situation is worse still if supervisors’ decision-making authority is subjective and unconstrained. Without the power and safety of more women at all
levels, harassed women “cannot effectively censor or counter stereotypes and

107

Zeba Blay, Sexual Harassment Isn’t About Sex, It’s About Power, HUFFPOST (Mar. 23,
2017, 5:12 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sexual-harassment-isnt-about-sex-its-about
-power_n_58d13b9fe4b00705db52c340 [https://perma.cc/3AJ2-4JU3].
108
Schultz 1998, supra note 98, at 1759.
109
Technology related industries include, for e.g., hardware, information technology services and telecom; and energy related industries include, for e.g., utilities and basic materials, oil and gas. See MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 66–67 (for data on these and
other industries, including along the pipeline).
110
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 14.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Schultz 2018, supra note 96, at 49–50.
114
Id. at 49.
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cannot effectively deter, resist, or report harassment.”115 At the same time, they
are not in positions that can meaningfully reshape the organization’s culture so
that it becomes a more inclusive environment.
Research also suggests that certain types of employees are more vulnerable, for example, young workers, workers with cultural and language differences, and employees with sexual orientation differences.116 More established
and older employees may target newer and younger employees where the power imbalance is great, and who they expect will be less likely to resist their advances.117 Workers with cultural and language differences may fear for their
jobs if they do not conform to others’ social pressures.118 And workers with
sexual orientation differences may be targeted as particularly threatening to
those with more traditional views of male and female roles.119
B.

Franchina v. City of Providence

Franchina v. City of Providence120 illustrates a case where sex discrimination and sexual harassment are interconnected, and where sexual desire does
not appear to be a motive for the harassment.121 It also illustrates how the risk
factors described above fuel Lori Francina’s “hostile work environment.”
115

Id.
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 8, 14.
117
See, e.g., THE ASSISTANT, supra note 106.
118
Chart of Risk Factors for Harassment and Responsive Strategies, U.S. EEOC, https://ww
w.eeoc.gov/chart-risk-factors-harassment-and-responsive-strategies [https://perma.cc/6AQZGWY3].
119
MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at 18, 20.
120
Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018).
121
Judge Thompson offers a detailed description of the facts, noting that though the City of
Providence “trivializes” the plaintiff Lori Franchina’s negative work experiences while
working with the Fire Department, the court “decline[s] to be as pithy in reciting Franchina’s
plight” in order to provide the proper context in which this case occurs. Id. at 38.
Another detailed accounting of sexual harassment, albeit in a very different setting, is
given in Chira & Einhorn, supra note 2. It is the story of a decades long, recurrent history of
sexual and racial harassment normalized by persistent and resilient cultural norms in two
Ford manufacturing plants in Chicago. Id. Chicago Assembly Plant manufactured cars and
its workforce is predominantly Black; Chicago Stamping Plant provided automobile parts
and its workforce is majority White. Id. In 2017, there were 5700 workers at both plants and
one-third were women Id. Both settings are unionized. Id. Their jobs are considered “golden
tickets”—coveted positions, with good pay, benefits, and relative security. Id.
However, beginning in the 1970s when women first worked permanently at the plants
and on the line, incidents of sexual harassment became numerous and insidious. Id. In the
1990s, Ford and the EEOC agreed to pay $22 million prompted by lawsuits and Ford’s
commitment to remedy the situation. Id. And while federal monitoring continued, the workplace apparently did improve. Id. But as federal monitoring ended, a culture of sexual harassment returned. Id. In 2017, Ford and the EEOC again reached a settlement of $10 million
for sexual and racial harassment, with five years of federal monitoring. Id. Numerous lawsuits are also still pending. Id.
The following case illustrates the intolerable working environment for women. Id. Ms.
Suzette Wright happily accepted a job as a data entry clerk at Ford, feeling fortunate to land
116
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Lori Franchina had no problems during the first four years of being a firefighter.122 To the contrary, after graduating tenth in her 80-person class at the
Providence Firefighter Academy, the Fire Department repeatedly recognized
her for her high performance and promoted her to Lieutenant.123 Her problems
began when she was assigned to work a shift with Andre Ferro, with Franchina
as the shift supervisor and Ferro as her driver.124 Ferro was a misogynist firefighter with a history of sexual harassment in the Department.125 He quickly
lived up to his reputation:
After arriving at the station for her shift and while pouring herself a cup of coffee, Franchina was immediately approached by Ferro who, without missing a
beat, asked if she was a lesbian. . . . After Franchina retorted that it was none of
his business, Ferro followed up with the statement, “I don’t normally like to
work with women; but, you know, we like the same thing, so I think we’re going
to get along.” Franchina testified she was appalled by his comments and as his
supervisor, instructed him not to say such things.126

a job at the big company that offered job security. Id. She quickly learned the downsides of
the environment for her and other women. Id.
As Ms. Wright settled in, she asked a co-worker to explain something: Why were men calling out “peanut butter legs” when she arrived in the morning? He demurred, but she insisted.
“He said: ‘Well peanut butter,’ ” Ms. Wright recalled. “ ‘Not only is it the color of your legs, but
it’s the kind of legs you like to spread.’ ”
Like many of the females who eventually sued Ford, Ms. Wright is African-American; those
accused of harassment include black, white and Latino men. Some of the women felt doubly victimized—propositioned and denounced as sluts while also being called “black bitches” and other
racial slurs. . . . As the affronts continued—lewd comments, repeated come-ons, men grabbing
their crotches and moaning every time she bent over—Ms. Wright tried to ignore them. Veteran
female employees warned that reporting the behavior brought only more trouble. The smallest
infraction, routinely overlooked, suddenly merited a write-up. The very nature of factory work—
the pressure to keep the production line going—gave bosses power to inflict petty humiliations,
such as denying bathroom breaks.
But after a man Ms. Wright had trusted as a mentor made a crack about paying her $5 for
oral sex, she asked her union representative for help. He began what she calls a “don’t-file-aclaim-against-Bill” campaign: Her co-worker would lose his job, his benefits, his pension, she
was told. Rumors spread, questioning their relationship. Then a union official delivered the final
insult: “Suzette, you’re a pretty woman—take it as a compliment.”

Id.
Instead, Ms. Wright felt that: “Each time that I was taking it, again and again, it just
felt like more of me diminishing . . . until [I] was just like a shell of a person.” Id.
Ford thus exemplifies a stratified workplace with large power disparities; a workplace
considered a male turf with an engrained culture of sexually abusive that resurfaces when
external supervision is removed. Women, typically minority women, are vulnerable because
they fear losing their jobs and so are hesitant to complain or resist. The union is also inconsistent in their position, especially when both the accused and the accusers are union members.
122
See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 38.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 38–39.
125
Id. at 38.
126
Id. at 39.
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Soon after, an emergency call came in and [they] were . . . dispatched. During
the emergency run [together,] Ferro continued with [his] inappropriate [sexual
comments]. He asked, for example, if Franchina wanted to have children and
quickly followed up with, “could help you with that,” implying that he wanted
to impregnate her. So incessant was the unprofessional chatter that Franchina
was forced to tell Ferro on multiple occasions to stop talking because she was
having difficulty hearing the dispatcher’s instructions.127

During the same shift, Franchina and Ferro were sent to the Rhode Island
Hospital.128 During the shift, Ferro approached a group of six firefighters including Franchina who were chatting together.129
Ferro approached the group and began rubbing his nipples in a circular
fashion, leapt up in the air, and screamed at Franchina, “My lesbian lover! How
are you doing?” Nurses, doctors, patients, and patients’ families were all present . . . Franchina . . . was horrified and felt belittled. . . Others . . . were similarly appalled.130

Back at the station at the end of the shift, Franchina went to her personal
quarters to change out of her uniform.131 Without knocking and against protocol, Ferro intruded on Franchina, dressed only in his underwear.132 Franchina,
dressed only in her undergarments, quickly grabbed a sheet to cover herself.133
She asked Ferro to leave, but only after telling him to “get the fuck out” of the
room did Ferro leave.134
Franchina did not initially report Ferro’s “repulsive” behavior.135 But Chief
Curt Varone heard about it and filed a written complaint against Ferro with the
possibility of him being terminated.136 However, both her supervisors and any
collegial support for Franchina quickly crumbled when word spread about Ferro’s disciplinary proceeding.137 Firefighters at her station began to treat her with
“contempt and disdain.”138 Among other incidents, Andy McDougal, a firefighter subordinate to her and the station cook, publicly yelled at her “What are
you trying to get him fucking fired?”139 Although the top supervisor at her station was present, he did not report or reprimand McDougal.140
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130
131
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134
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40.
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Id.
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Over the next two years, Franchina was subject to a repeated and persistent
barrage of insults, insubordination, and sabotage—frequently called “bitch,
cunt or Franchina.”141 On one occasion, McDougal exclaimed loudly in her
presence “affirmative action’s killing this fucking job.”142 At another time, he
intentionally shoved Franchina into the wall.143 Again, although she complained, nothing was done.144
At one point, the men at her station used a white board in a common area
to taunt her.145
Twenty-one total insults were written on the board including: . . . “you get
what you get, bitch,” and “Frangina leads Team Lesbo to victory.” [She] testified that she personally heard Captain Peter Spedutii, a thirty-year veteran of the
Department, point at the white board and say, “I’ll show her[,]” . . . [and] him
brag[ging about the derogatory comments that were] written on the board. Although Franchina complained to [Superior] Chief Michael Crawford, . . . the
perpetrators were not reprimanded . . . and [the insulting remarks] remained up
over 14 hours.146

Thus, Franchina is the story of a highly qualified performer, relatively early in her career, who experiences much bullying because of her gender and perceived sexual orientation. She has no work problems until the homogeneous
and male-dominated culture is threatened. Egregious and vulgar harassment by
one misogynist firefighter and concerns about his welfare quickly inspire others
to also harass her.147 As a way to defend their culture and masculine solidarity,
her male colleagues collectively turn on her. Their insults and abusive actions
are demeaning, gendered and sexually-insulting. Her sexual orientation makes
her more vulnerable to their tactics.
Even after Franchina repeatedly complains, her all-male supervisors and
the institutional structure fail her. She is alone, with no way to address the
power disparity that female firefighters face. Her male supervisors exercise
their power and discretion in ways that minimize or ignore her harassment in
the interest of traditional male cohesiveness.
In summary, while many continue to believe the myth that sexual harassment is no longer prevalent, overwhelming evidence indicates otherwise. Furthermore, a related faulty belief is that sex discrimination and sexual harassment are really two different phenomena.148 However, as work by Shultz and
others reveal, and cases such as the Franchina case graphically illustrate, sex
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See discussion in supra Section II.A.
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discrimination and sexual harassment have a common motivation of demeaning
and dominating women.149
III. MYTH: SEXUAL HARASSERS ARE STOPPED AND PUNISHED
We would like to think that even if sexual harassment does occur from
time to time, it is quickly and appropriately dealt with: Harassers are identified,
employers and the harasser are held responsible, and the harasser is stopped
and punished. The unfortunate reality is different. The formal processes for resolving these disputes all too often do not result in alleged harassers being publicly identified, in employers being held accountable, or in harassers being punished.
As we discuss below, the dispute resolution process is problematic from
the beginning: Faced with a system stacked against them, victims are often silent about the harassment. And even those who decide to formally complain
face either a litigation process that is ineffective at addressing harassment or an
unwanted arbitration process in which they are systematically disadvantaged.
Not surprising then, in both litigation and arbitration, the outcomes greatly favor the employer and often the alleged harasser is not stopped or punished.
A. Victims Do Not Report Harassment
In recent years, the media has reported numerous women’s public complaints about workplace sexual harassment and assault.150 Launching a muchpublicized me-too movement, these victims broke a barrier of silence.151 But
these women and their public revelations are the exception rather than the rule.
Large-scale studies show that employees who believe they have been sexually harassed rarely report what has happened to them.152 Estimates are that
87–94% do not formally complain.153 It turns out that workplace culture and
practices deter rather than encourage women from complaining. Due to this
high number of unreported incidents, statistics on the prevalence of sexual harassment are gross underestimates.154
149

See discussion in supra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Amanda Becker, Inside the Lincoln Project’s ‘Toxic’ Workplace: Accusations
of Sexual Harassment and a Culture of Infighting, USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/15/inside-lincoln-project-claims-harassment-sexi
sm-toxic-workplace/4483922001/ [perma.cc/S4A5-9MBH].
151
Jessica Bennett, The #MeToo Moment, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/series/met
oo-moment [perma.cc/2PRM-L87D] (a database the New York Times continuously updates
with #MeToo stories).
152
See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 3; MCKINSEY REPORT 2018, supra note 29, at
22; Deborah L. Brake, Coworker Retaliation in the #MeToo Era, 49 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 50
(2019) [hereinafter Brake, Coworkers]; Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18,
25 (2005) [hereinafter Brake, Retaliation].
153
See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 7; Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 50.
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See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 7.
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Why does this happen? Research indicates that employee silence is
prompted by the following.155 First, there are victims’ personal and social
costs.156 An essential step toward reporting harassment is victim’s acknowledgement that it has happened.157 But often victims rationalize what occurs, resulting in their denial of the harassment: “Perhaps it was a misunderstanding.”
“He wouldn’t do that.” “I can trust his intentions.”158 Those who have been
harassed do not want to see themselves as “victims” of sexual harassment.159
Doing so forces them to acknowledge their vulnerability and loss of control. It
also threatens their beliefs in a just and meritocratic society which they formally believed. Employees also hesitate to complain to others because they fear
being socially ostracized.160 They worry about what coworkers and bosses will
think of them.161
Second, victims have concerns about their employers’ reactions.162 Workers fear employers’ retaliation if they complain.163 They are concerned that employers will either blame them for what has occurred, or consider their complaint so disruptive to the workplace that they want the complaining employee
removed.164 In addition, victims fear that the employer will do nothing, perhaps
not even further investigate.165 Given this, asking employees to formally complain is asking them to take risks with a high likelihood of no meaningful improvement in their situation. Knowing that victims are unlikely to report incidents, harassers may well continue harassment, knowing that there are no
negative consequences.166 Employers’ inaction effectively normalizes the harassers’ misconduct.
Finally, victims question their legal protection.167 They hesitate to report
harassment because they do not know if they can successfully sue the harasser
and employer, and whether there is adequate legal protection against employer
retaliation.168 They may have heard that sexual harassment laws are not particularly effective, and of course, the costs and distress of litigation are daunting.169
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Id. at 3; Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 50–51.
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 3; Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 50–51.
Brake, Retaliation, supra note 152, at 26.
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Id. at 26.
Id. at 28, 32, 34.
Id. at 32, 34.
Id. at 36–37; FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 3.
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Unfortunately, it turns out that these employee hesitations and fears are
well-founded.170 Co-workers, particularly men, tend to blame those who claim
to be victims of discrimination.171 They are labeled as whiners and criticized for
disrupting the perceived workplace harmony.172 And as indicated by many lawsuits, employers do sometimes retaliate.173 Particularly if the alleged harasser is
a star performer, employers may do nothing to ameliorate the situation.174 Or
they may even shift the burden to the harassed employee by removing them involuntarily, either by changing their job or by finding an excuse for firing
them.175 And as discussed later, the victims’ concern about the lack of legal
protection is also justified.176 The law does not provide a reliable safety net, either for sexual harassment or for retaliation. Plaintiffs in sexual harassment litigation have a very poor success rate.177
Plus, the well-established at-will employment doctrine confirms that employers are in control of an employee’s job security.178 As a strong presumptive
general rule, employers can fire an employee at its will, without notice and for
any reason.179 Except for narrowly defined public policy and statutory and contractual exceptions, the “at-will doctrine” prioritizes employers’ autonomy and
discretion over employers’ right to their jobs.180
Bystanders of harassment are similarly silent. The McKinsey Report found
that one in four employees “sometimes or very often saw biased behavior toward women.”181 But of this group of bystanders, only a third objected.182 By170

FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 10; Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 1–2, 10
(describing three doctrines that pose difficulties for Title VII protections against coworker
retaliation); Brake, Retaliation, supra note 152, at 32–41.
171
See generally Renata Bongiorno et al., Why Women Are Blamed for Being Sexually Harassed: The Effects of Empathy for Female Victims and Male Perpetrators, 44 PSYCH.
WOMEN Q. 11 (2020).
172
Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 2–3 (noting common tendency to blame persons
who identify themselves as victims of discrimination even when there is contrary evidence, a
tendency that is enhanced by the belief in a just and meritocratic society); Katie R. Eyer,
That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96
MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1309 (2012).
173
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 10; Brake, Retaliation, supra note 152, at 32.
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FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 13.
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See id.
176
See infra text accompanying notes 188-97.
177
See infra text accompanying notes 188-97.
178
The well-established at-will employment doctrine also substantiates employees’ lack of
control and choices. The doctrine provides employers the presumptive right to terminate any
employee for any reason. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (AM L. INST.
2015). Ironically, employment discrimination laws are one of a select few exceptions to this
general rule. E.g., 42 U.S. C. § 2000e–2(a) (1964).
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Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the Employment AtWill Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2017).
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MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 44.
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standers fear the risks of hurting their careers and their social standing in the
workplace.183 At the same time, they also question whether their calling out the
harassment will make a difference.184 This lack of confidence in employers’ responsiveness is born out, given that half of the employees who objected say
nothing happened as a result.185 Their fear of hurting their careers is also a legitimate concern, given the limited protection under employment law for
“whistle-blowers” and under retaliation claims.186
B. Litigation and the Victims’ Dismal Prospects
Even if aggrieved employees take the very difficult step of formally complaining, there is little assurance that the harassment will be recognized and that
the perpetrator is stopped and punished. The employee’s complaint is predictably met with the employer’s and alleged harasser’s denials, so the parties’ dispute must be resolved. The employee’s alternative formal paths are litigation or
arbitration. As shown in the following illustration and subsequently discussed,
both paths offer plaintiffs’ dismal outcomes.187
ILLUSTRATION. FEW HARASSERS AND EMPLOYERS ARE IDENTIFIED AND PUNISHED
THROUGH LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
Out of 100 alleged harassments, only 15 victims formally complain—
-> If these 15 go to litigation, in only 4 cases do plaintiffs succeed, which is only 4% of
100 alleged harassments
-> If these 15 go to arbitration, in only 2 cases do complainants succeed, which is only
2% of 100 alleged harassments

On one hand, litigation offers the opportunity to resolve this particular dispute, but it also serves collateral purposes. Litigation is a public process, so the
alleged harasser and an employer’s inadequate response are made known. And
public identification could potentially prevent others from harm from particular
harasser, especially if the court holds for the plaintiff. Other potential harassers
will also be more hesitant to harass given the plight of the harasser in this case.
183

Id.
Id.
185
Id.
186
Brake, Retaliation, supra note 152, at 36–37.
187
Settlement and informal internal grievance procedures (such as counseling, ombudsperson, etc.) are also possible. Data on these procedures, however, are very difficult to ascertain
and not systematically reported, as far as the author is aware. Our discussion here, therefore,
focuses on the formal procedures of litigation and arbitration. The illustration is based on
data provided in FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88 (indicating an estimated 85% of those
harassed do not formally complain), and Pat K. Chew, Comparing the Effects of Judges’
Gender and Arbitrators’ Gender in Sex Discrimination Cases and Why It Matters, 32 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 195, 207 (2017) (using data on complainants’ success rate in litigation
and arbitration, indicating that 27% (plaintiff success rate) of 15 = 4.05 and 14% (complainants’ success rate) of 15 = 2.1).
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Even if the plaintiff is not successful, the public revelation of her allegations
may provide a cautionary tale of potential employer and harasser liabilities. The
litigation system also has due process safeguards that help plaintiffs access information they need to build their case.
On the other hand, those employees that bring sexual harassment lawsuits
face an uphill battle. Ultimately, they will most likely lose. Empirical evidence
indicates that plaintiffs in federal courts are successful in only about 25% of the
cases.188 Why these dismal prospects for holding employers and harassers responsible? There are at least two explanations: first is that the law is ineffective
in stopping sexual harassment; and second is that judges as a whole find it difficult to identify and therefore fully understand the victim’s workplace predicament.
Scholars and practitioners have extensively critiqued the law, explaining
why it has been so ineffective in stopping sexual harassment.189 While the Supreme Court case of Harris v. Forklift heralded the landmark extension of Title
VII sex discrimination protection to sexual harassment in 1993,190 sexual harassment jurisprudence has since evolved in ways that narrow rather than expand possible protections against sexual harassment. The legal standards for
proving sexual harassment, for instance, that the harassment must be “pervasive
or severe” and that the harassment must be attributed to the plaintiff’s sex, have
been interpreted as so demanding that fact patterns satisfying those standards
tend to be very limited.191 For instance, while many courts recognize explicit
forms of harassment, the more common and pervasive subtle forms of harassment confirmed by social scientists192 are not acknowledged. At the same time,
the law provides employers with a convenient affirmative defense of providing
a “reasonable” grievance procedure—without appreciating the psychological
and practical difficulties for an employee to actually use those procedures.193 In
short, the legal net for catching sexual harassment is too small to effectively
address all the sexual harassment that actually occurs in the workplace.
In addition, the gender composition of judges also affects the outcomes of
sexual harassment cases. Research consistently shows that male judges are less
likely than female judges to hold for plaintiffs, who are typically female, in sex
discrimination and sexual harassment cases (called the “gender effect”).194 Jen188

See Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisonmaking in
the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1768 (2005).
189
See, e.g., Brake, Coworkers, supra note 152, at 5–6 (me too movement is a critique of
law); Tristin Green, Was Sexual Harassment Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 152 (2018).
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Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
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See cases cited supra note 3.
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Chew, supra note 187, at 200–01; Pat K. Chew, Judges’ Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 359, 366–67 (2011).
193
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
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Chew, supra note 187, at 197–99.
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nifer Peresie, for instance, found that male judges hold for the plaintiffs only
24% of the time; female judges hold for the plaintiffs 39% of the time.195 Presumably, female judges are better able to understand the nuances of sexual harassment in the workplace such as more subtle forms of harassment.196 At the
same time, 87.8% of federal judges are male and only 12.2% are female.197
Given this dominance of men as judges, plus the very high standards for establishing sexual harassment under the law, it is no wonder that harassed women
cannot rely on litigation to punish their harassers and their employers.
C. Arbitration and Victims’ Even More Dismal Outcomes
As discussed above, employees’ prospects for a favorable resolution in litigation are not promising. But the litigation process at least allows the public
discourse on the alleged harasser, the actions on which the plaintiff bases her or
his complaint, and the employer’s actions or lack of actions.198 The litigation
process also has the procedural protections of due process guaranteed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and the right to an appellate review
on the merits. And in approximately a quarter of cases, the employer and alleged harasser are held accountable to some extent.199
In contrast, mandatory employment arbitration characteristically does not
have any of these attributes.200 The arbitration process is private and confidential, so the allegations are not public.201 FRCP are not mandated, and there is no
judicial review on the merits. Instead of judges selected through a public vetting process, arbitrators privately selected by the parties determine the outcome.
Not surprisingly, while plaintiffs face dismal odds in litigation, preliminary research indicates that the prospects for success in arbitration are even worse—in
only 14% of the cases are the employer and alleged harasser held accountable.202
Yet employers increasingly use mandatory employment arbitration to resolve harassment claims. As Jean Sternlight observes, once the Supreme Court
gave the green light to employment arbitration in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
195

Peresie, supra note 188, at 1769; see also Christina Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal
Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 406 (2010).
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Chew, supra note 187, at 199–203.
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Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–present, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search [perma.cc/BX8F-CAJ4] (finding
out of 3801 federal judges, 3338 are male and 463 are female).
198
See Jean Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1662–64 (2005); cf. Maureen A. Weston, Buying Secrecy: Non-Disclosure Agreements, Arbitration, and Professional Ethics in the #MeToo Era, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 510–14
(2021).
199
Peresie, supra note 188, at 1769.
200
Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1664.
201
Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 KAN. L. REV.
1255, 1256 (2006).
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Lane Corp.,203 companies quickly gravitated toward it.204 In many work settings
today, mandatory employment arbitration is typically part of the employment
agreement between employers and its workers.205 This excerpt from a typical
provision in an employment agreement illustrates:
In consideration of my employment with this company and its promise to arbitrate all disputes, I agree that . . . any and all past, present, or future controversies, claims, or disputes between the company . . . and me, including but not limited to any disputes arising from my employment or termination of my
employment (“Disputes”) will be subject to binding arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act.
Disputes include, but are not limited to, any federal or state statutory claim,
including but not limited to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and all other civil rights statutes, claims of retaliation, harassment, discrimination, or
wrongful termination, and any other contractual, tort, or statutory claims to the
extent allowed by law.
I understand that, except as provided below, the company and I waive any
right to a judge or jury trial on any Dispute. 206

Particularly pertinent for our discussion, the contract language requires
employers to use arbitration instead of litigation for their sexual harassment
complaints. In addition, all kinds of other disputes are covered, extending to all
kinds of employee complaints about discrimination, privacy, loyalty, and competition. From the employer’s point of view, the broader the scope the better.
And as discussed below, it exemplifies employers’ advantage over employees
at every stage of the arbitration process—from the design of the process itself
to the selection of the arbitrators.
1. Employer-Drafted Terms
Employment arbitration is attractive to employers for many reasons, including their higher likelihood of success and their assumption that arbitration
has lower costs and is a speedier process than litigation.207 Another primary attraction is that it is a confidential and private way to deal with employees’
complaints of harassment, thus helping employers keep these disputes and any
possible negative reputational harm under wraps.208 The employee’s complaint
203

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1637–40.
205
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION 1–2 (2018).
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This provision is illustrative, based on a composite of the provisions currently used by
two technology companies in California. See infra Appendix.
207
KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC:
MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 18–19
(2015) [hereinafter THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC].
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Reputational concerns can be both internal (e.g., harm to workplace morale and company
loyalty; providing incentives for other employees to complain) and external (e.g., harm to
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and the arbitrator’s decision is not known to any external third parties, including customers, competitors, and journalists. The arbitrations, including the employees’ arguments and employers’ defenses are behind closed doors. Thus,
companies can keep discrete employees’ detailed complaints of a supervisor’s
inappropriate conduct and possible management cover-up from other employees internally as well as third parties externally.209
Courts allow the employer to treat employment arbitration agreements as
an enforceable privately negotiated contract.210 As with any contracts, which
are not inherently unfair, contracts providing for arbitration are not inherently
unfair.211 The typical contract providing for employment arbitration, however,
tends to have terms more advantageous to employers since they are drafted by
employers’ lawyers and with the employer’s interest in mind. Employers’ lawyers intentionally and understandably draft them in their clients’ own interest to
assure maximum confidentiality and maximum management control.212
Employees, while theoretically able to negotiate terms more protective of
their interests, are in reality offered these completed agreements as a condition
of employment. It is the rare case where prospective employees take the risks
or have the leverage to push back on the terms of the standardized provisions
typically embedded in the general employment agreement. Instead, new employees feel that the general employment agreement including the terms on arbitration are “take it or leave it”, with the “leave it” option tantamount to turning down the employment opportunity.213 In this way, these arbitration
agreements are a condition of employment.
Increasingly, employers are using these arbitration agreements and agreements obligating the parties to keep confidential the dispute and its resolution
in non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in combination to doubly assure that allegations of sexual harassment and the resolution of claims stay secret.214 As
Maureen Weston points out, this means that sexual harassers go unreported and
possibly unpunished, resulting in ongoing public safety risks.215 Even if arbitrators conclude harassment has occurred, their companies may still allow harassers to continue their jobs because, for instance, they are outstanding revenue
producers for their companies—thus allowing the perpetrators to harass again

209
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within the company.216 Even if the harassers are fired from one job for their
misconduct, they can go on to other jobs in other places and continue their harassment in the new setting—protected by the secrecy of the arbitration proceedings as required in the arbitration agreement and an NDA.217
2. Arbitration Procedures Favor Employers
As drafters of the arbitration agreement, employers understandably design
an arbitration process with procedures that are as efficient, inexpensive, and
convenient for them as possible. Unlike litigation, the FRCP or comparable
state due process rules are not required in arbitration. While the arbitration
agreement may refer to or incorporate the rules of a private arbitral administrators, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or JAMS Mediation,
Arbitration and ADR Services, these rules are much less comprehensive than
the FRCP.218
The differences between the procedural rules that employers draft and the
FRCP are understandable given that the FRCP priority is to assure the fullest
fairest process for resolving disputes,219 while employers prioritize their efficiency goals over comprehensive due process. Thus, arbitration procedures in
the arbitration agreement are predictably less protective of an employee’s due
process than the protection afforded under the FRCP.
What is the consequence? A consideration of the FRCP rules on discovery
illustrate. While FRCP rules have many purposes, one important goal is procedures that help assure relevant, reliable, and fair disclosure.220 According to the
FRCP, “[t]hrough discovery, the parties find out what the other side’s claims or
defenses are really all about and what facts they are based upon.”221 Each party
can use five discovery tools: depositions, interrogatories, requests for production, medical examinations if the court grants a party’s motion, and requests for
admissions. 222 And there are required disclosures between the parties: identifying each person “likely to have discoverable information . . . the . . . party may
use to support its claims or defenses, [identifying all documents or objects in
control of each party]”223 that she may use to support her claims or defenses,
plaintiff’s assessment and proof of damages, and defendant’s insurance agreements. With a “watchful eye,” the court oversees compliance with discovery
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rules. Unless the court orders otherwise, parties may discover “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”224
These discovery rules, however, are not required or are much more limited
than discovery procedures in litigation.225 In an employment case, the employer’s actions and records may contain critical information for supporting the
employee’s claims that would be very difficult for the aggrieved employee to
obtain in the absence of mandated discovery rules. Thus, the scope of an employee’s rights to discovery can make a critical difference in the employee’s
success or failure.226
In addition to diminished or nonexistent discovery procedures, employers
also often draft arbitration agreements that do not have other due process rules
required in litigation. For example, courts are automatically obligated to follow
legal principles and legal precedents, but arbitrators are not.227 The arbitration
agreement provides the basis of the arbitrator’s decision-making. While the
agreement can specify legal principles and precedents, it is not unusual for it to
provide for an alternative basis—such as industry standards, fairness, or strict
compliance with any “contract” terms. In the absence of any specified basis for
decision-making, the arbitrators are presumptively left to use their own discretion.
Another example is the appeals process built into the litigation system. In
the interest of efficiency, arbitration agreements routinely provide that the arbitrator’s decision is not subject to any judicial review or appeal.228 Consistent
with the typical terms of the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator’s decision is
“final and binding.”229 There is no further review on the merits; the employees’ “day in arbitration” is over and there is no “day in court.”
3. Arbitrators Inclined Toward Employer Perspective
Employees are further disadvantaged in arbitration because of the arbitrators themselves. There is increasing evidence that arbitrators in employment
cases are inclined toward the employers’ perspective. This occurs primarily because of the employers’ advantage as “repeat players” in selecting arbitrators

224
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See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1641 n.51 (noting limited discovery in arbitration); see also infra Appendix (providing a sample arbitration agreement which shows no
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from a pool of eager arbitrators.230 In addition, arbitrators are disproportionately
males and are thus less likely to intuitively identify with the plaintiffs’ predicaments given that plaintiffs are most often female.231
In theory, both employers and employees select the arbitrator. But in practice, employers have advantages in selecting the arbitrator. As repeat players,
they have more experience with the arbitration process and are more knowledgeable about prospective arbitrators and their reputations. Employers understandably select arbitrators that are receptive to the management perspective.232
Andrea Cann Chandrasekhar and David Horton confirm this employer’s
advantage in consumer arbitration.233 They note that “even controlling for other
factors, companies that arbitrate more than once boast higher win rates than
one-shot firms.”234 Similarly, Alexander Colvin and Mark Gough investigated
2,802 employment arbitration cases administered over an 11-year period by the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), looking for predictors of employee
wins and damage amounts in an award.235 They found that larger-scale employers who are involved in more arbitration cases tend to have higher win rates and
have lower damage awards made against them.236 Their study also provides evidence of a significant repeat employer-arbitrator pair effect: employers that use
the same arbitrator on multiple occasions win more often and have lower damages awarded against them than do employers appearing before an arbitrator for
the first time.237
In addition, arbitrators as a professional group are already attuned to the
employers’ perspective. Judges are the decisionmakers in litigation, and arbitrators are the decisionmakers in arbitration. However, unlike judges, arbitrators
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is with the experience hypothesis.” Id.; see also Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1649–50.
234
Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 233.
235
Colvin & Gough, supra note 230, at 1019.
236
Id. (“The authors find that self-represented employees tend to settle cases less often, win
cases that proceed to a hearing less often, and receive lower damage awards.”).
237
Id.; Chew, supra note 187, at 207.
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have to compete for business.238 Arbitrators, recognizing employers as repeat
players, understand that they are an important target market. They need employers to find them acceptable as arbitrators, and therefore want a reputation
as being receptive to the employer’s perspective. These market pressures shape
the pool of arbitrators, so that only the ones acceptable to employers stay in
business. These market dynamics tend to favor employers.
As suggested above, arbitrators as a group are already inclined toward employer perspectives. In addition, arbitrators are also a homogenous group, most
likely to be white males.239 Employees in harassment disputes are from diverse
gender and racial backgrounds. They are more likely to be women in sexual
harassment and sex discrimination claims. Minority employees, particularly
Blacks, are the most frequent plaintiffs in racial harassment and discrimination
claims.240 Drawing from the research on the effect of judges’ gender in sexual
harassment litigation,241 it would predict that male arbitrators in sexual harassment arbitration cases are less likely to hold for employees than female arbitrators.242 This supposedly occurs because female arbitrators are better able to understand female employees’ situation, while male arbitrators would find it more
difficult to identify with female worker’s experiences of sexual harassment.243
CONCLUSION
IV. MYTHS AND REALITIES
Three interconnected myths help us rationalize and minimize sexual harassment in the workplace: (1) sex discrimination is no longer prevalent; (2)
sexual harassment is no longer pervasive; and (3) in the unlikely event there is
sexual harassment, the harassment is stopped and the harasser is punished. As
this Article explains, the unfortunate reality is often the opposite.
Sex discrimination is still prevalent in many work settings as evidenced by
documented pay gaps, underrepresentation that is perpetuated by barriers to advancement, and disproportionate microaggressions. Ongoing sex discrimination
is explained in part by entrenched and sometimes unconscious cultural beliefs
238

See Chew, supra note 187, at 210.
See id. at 211, 216.
240
Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis
of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1143 (2009).
241
Chew, supra note 187, at 197–203.
242
But see Colvin & Gough, supra note 230, at 1019, 1023 (“Female arbitrators and experienced professional labor arbitrators render awards in favor of employees less often than do
male arbitrators and other arbitrators.”).
243
The author’s research, however, suggests that this gender effect in arbitration is more tentative and complicated by the market dynamics described above. Research findings suggest
that the pro-employer inclinations, prompted by the market forces described above, trump
over the general tendency for female decision-makers to more intuitively understand sexual
harassment and be more disposed toward female complainants. Chew, supra note 187, at
202–03, 211.
239
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about the ideal roles of men and women in relationship to the workplace. In addition, we rationalize problems by the mistaken beliefs that progress is “just a
matter of time” and that progress is actually in women’s control.
Contrary to the second myth that sexual harassment is no longer a problem,
sexual harassment in its many forms is pervasive in many settings. This reality
is not surprising given that sex discrimination and sexual harassment have a
common basis: protection of men’s dominance in certain industries and jobs by
controlling, demeaning, and insulting women who threaten male turf. As Vicki
Shultz and other scholars observe, sexual harassment is more about sexism than
sexual desire.244
The third myth is that when sexual harassment occurs, the harassers and
their employers are stopped and punished. All too often, this does not happen.
The processes for formally resolving these sexual harassment disputes are often
fraught with frustrations and failure for victims of sexual harassment. First of
all, the workplace culture discourages victims from reporting. Plaintiffs who
move ahead with litigation confront laws and precedents that create exceedingly high evidentiary burdens and judges who do not intuitively appreciate their
perspectives. Pursuant to their employment agreements, many employees do
not even have the option of suing. Thus, many victims are forced into employment arbitration where the odds are even more stacked against them. Employers have numerous advantages in arbitration, including their design of the arbitration process and other substantiated “repeat player” benefits. Arbitrators also
have market pressures to be receptive to employers’ and alleged harassers’ argument. As Jean Sternlight and Maureen Weston observe: mandatory employment arbitration and nondisclosure agreements result in too many harassers getting away with harassment.245
V. PROPOSALS
A comprehensive plan to dismantle these myths and provide solutions to
sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and employment arbitration goes well
beyond the purpose of this Article.246 However, a few curated proposals on sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, and employment arbitration are offered to
get us thinking about what we can do.
A. Proposal for Sex Discrimination: Fixing the Broken Rung
In our discussion of ongoing sex discrimination, the problem of the “broken rung” in the promotion ladder is highlighted. As the McKinsey Report reveals in their study, for every 100 men promoted, only 72 women are promot-

244

Schultz 1998, supra note 98, at 1755.
See Sternlight, supra note 198, at 1664; Weston, supra note 198, at 522–23.
246
See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 88, at 66–71 (offering more comprehensive plan for
addressing sexual harassment).
245
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ed.247 This gender disparity obviously affects the specific women who are not
promoted, but this broken rung also has longer term broader future effects. Reducing the number of women who enter that initial step in the management
ladder decreases the pool in every subsequent stage (e.g., senior manager/director, vice-president, senior vice-president, and C-suite leaders) of the
pipeline thereafter. “[U]nless we close the disparities in hiring and promotions
that make up the broken rung, we are many decades away from reaching parity,
if we reach it at all.”248
FIVE STEPS FOR FIXING THE BROKEN RUNG:249
--Set goals.
Rather than aspiring in general terms, employers can set specific and bold targets for
representation of women at the first-level of management. By publicizing these goals,
employers would be held accountable and garner support for these goals.
--Require diverse slates for hiring and promotions.
Increasing the number of diverse candidates for hiring and promotions can notably increase the probability of a woman getting the position. Sincere and committed efforts to
find well-qualified candidates is important.
--Evaluators should have unconscious bias training.
Employers are becoming increasingly aware of the effects of unconscious bias in employment decisions—triggering unfair and gendered assumptions about the future potential of certain candidates. Training in unconscious bias appears to make a positive
difference in companies making progress.
--Establish clear evaluation criteria.
Employers should have in place the evaluation criteria before the review process begins.
Evaluation tools should be based on objective and measurable input reflective of the
evaluation criteria. Candidates should have a safe way to disclose their impressions of
potential bias.
--Put more women in line.
Employers should be sure women have access to opportunities that put them in line for
management. This includes leadership training, sponsorship, and high-profile assignments.

B. Proposal for Sexual Harassment: Bystander Intervention
In our discussion of ongoing sexual harassment, we note the possible role
of others in intervening in harassment or supporting those who do complain.
Workplace leaders and colleagues at all levels can identify and help stop harassment—thus helping to change the norms for what is acceptable and respectful conduct. But as we discussed, bystander intervention is currently the exception rather than the rule.250 How do we change that?
247
248
249
250

MCKINSEY REPORT 2019, supra note 3, at 11.
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Supra Part IV.
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There is encouraging evidence that training programs in bystander intervention can be successful. In a macro-review of research on the topic, Gabriel
Mujal and his co-researchers found that training programs used in university
and college settings have been effective in changing bystanders’ attitudes and
conduct.251 Through a series of steps, participants become more aware of the
problems and learn how to take responsibility to solve them.252 Two particular
training programs, “Bringing in the Bystander” and the “The Men’s Program,”
have the most consistent effectiveness.253
While more widely used in university and college settings for sexual assaults, the promotion and training for bystander intervention in sexual harassment is slowly being utilized in the workplace.254 Two states, New York and
Connecticut, have recently incorporated bystander training into their sexual
harassment laws for employers.255 Lauren Daley and her coauthors for Catalyst
(a gender-equity in the workplace organization) describe bystander intervention
training of employees.256 It should include the following training and practice:
recognizing when they may feel reluctant to intervene (barriers), when to intervene, what behaviors to intervene on (defining sexual harassment), and how to
251

Gabriela Mujal et al., A Systematic Review of Bystander Interventions for the Prevention
of Sexual Violence, 22 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 381, 392–93 (2019).
252
Id. at 387.
253
Id. at 381–82; see also Bystander Intervention Tips and Strategies, NAT’L SEXUAL
VIOLENCE RES. CTR. (2018), https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/publications_
nsvrc_tip-sheet_bystander-intervention-tips-and-strategies_1.pdf [perma.cc/2XX8-MTSQ].
254
See, e.g., Brigid Schulte, To Combat Harassment, More Companies Should Try Bystander Training, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 31, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/to-combatharassment-more-companies-should-try-bystander-training [perma.cc/3PGW-CGTF].
255
Connecticut’s Governor’s Bill 5043 (“An Act Promoting a Fair, Civil and Harassmentfree Workplace”) goes into effect October 1, 2019 and new training requirements include a
section on “Bystander Intervention” and similarly, beginning April 1, 2019, New York City
employers with 15 or more employees must provide anti-sexual harassment training to all of
their New York City employees on an annual basis (Stop Sexual Harassment in NYC Act).
This includes information regarding Bystander Intervention, including resources that explain
how to engage in Bystander Intervention. See H.B. 5043, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess.
(Conn. 2018); Stop Sexual Harassment in NYC Act, Local Law 96 § 8-107 (2018). Some
laws, such as Good Samaritan Laws, are intended to protect bystanders from liability for any
harm that may be caused by their intervention. For instance, these laws seem less applicable
to intervention to sexual harassment in the workplace, where harms caused by a bystander’s
intervention are hard to imagine. Other laws encourage or even impose a duty to intervene in
certain misconduct, and thereby impose liability on you if you do not intervene. These laws
however typically target bystander intervention in sexual assault and rape and not in the
more typical kinds of non-violent sexual harassment misconduct in the workplace. See, e.g.,
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-1-5.1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Regul. Sess.); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.027 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.). See generally Zachary D.
Kaufman, Protectors of Predators of Prey: Bystanders and Upstanders Amid Sexual Crimes,
92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1325 (2019).
256
LAUREN P. DALEY ET AL., CATALYST, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: HOW
COMPANIES CAN PREPARE, PREVENT, RESPOND AND TRANSFORM THEIR CULTURE 8–9 (2018),
https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/sexual_harassment_in_the_workplace
_report.pdf [perma.cc/E89U-6K6C].

21 NEV. L.J. 1223

1258

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

intervene.257 Steps in “how to intervene” (sometimes called the 4 Ds +) include
how to directly confront the situation (direct), how to create a distraction (distract), how to get help (delegate), how to touch base with the target later (delay), and how to report.258
Effective training of course has to be part of a broader workplace culture
where management clearly endorses and is committed to a workplace of civility
and mutual respect among all employees, regardless of their gender. Management should create “a culture of accountability free from retaliation” for those
who complain about and intervene in sexual harassment.259
C. Proposal for Employment Arbitrations: Recalibrating the Power
Finally, we recall our discussion of the frustrating and ineffective alternatives for those who have been harassed and want to do something to stop and
punish the harasser. Among other topics, we explored the lop-sided advantages
of employers over complaining employees in the arbitration process. How can
we recalibrate the parties’ relative positions so that there is a fairer playing
field? By doing so, we improve the efficacy of identifying and stopping harassment in the workplace, instead of harassers slipping through without any repercussions.
One way to fundamentally change the current situation is to no longer
make arbitration mandatory, but instead to return the presumptive power of
employees’ choice of litigation or arbitration to employees. At the very least,
this would encourage employers to offer arbitration provisions that would be
more attractive to employees. For instance, the proposed provision could assure
more discovery of relevant materials. Employees could also be assured of more
of a voice in the selection of arbitrators and more gender-diverse arbitrators
from which to select.
However, there are currently few examples of recalibrating the employers’
power to require mandatory employment arbitration. One example was prompted by the unusual leverage of a group of very desirable job applicants; the second was instituted by state law. In the first example, it was brought to the attention of Harvard Law students interviewing at a well-known West Coast law
firm for summer associate positions, that the firm would require them to sign a
mandatory arbitration agreement.260 This agreement would require them to go
257

Id. at 9; see also Schulte, supra note 254.
DALEY ET AL., supra note 256, at 9.
259
Id. at 8.
260
This event occurred while I was teaching at Harvard Law School in the spring semester
2018, and involved students discussed with me what was happening. See Stephanie Francis
Ward, A Group of Harvard Law Students Is Trying to Get Rid of Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses, ABA J. (Sept. 1, 2019, 1:20 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/par
ity-to-the-people [perma.cc/4X2L-299L]; Sejal Singh & Andre Manuel, Harvard Law Students Are Taking on Forced Arbitration, NATION (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.thenation.co
m/article/archive/harvard-law-students-are-taking-on-forced-arbitration/ [perma.cc/9HQG-C
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to arbitration for an array of employee claims, including sexual harassment
claims. Unlike many other law students, Harvard Law students enjoy the privilege of firms competing over them.261 Exercising their very real competitive
leverage, they made public their objection to this firm’s mandatory arbitration
requirement and prompted attention to other firms’ similar practice.262 This
West Coast law firm consequently changed their policy so that their employees
(including their summer associates) would not be forced into arbitration to resolve their sexual harassment complaints.263
The second example is not dependent on the leverage of highly-desirable
job applicants, but instead more inclusively protects all job applicants and employees in California.264 Under a new state law, an employer cannot require any
applicant for employment or any employee to “waive any right, forum, or procedure for a violation of any provision of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA) or other specific statutes governing employment as a
condition of employment. . . . This bill would additionally make violations of
the prohibitions described above, relating to the waiver of rights, forums, or
procedures, unlawful employment practices under FEHA.”265 In other words,
employers cannot require job applicants or employees to resolve state-based
discrimination and labor code claims in arbitration. This would include sexual
harassment claims made under state law. Furthermore, employers face legal
consequences for threatening, retaliating, or discriminating against any worker
who refuses to waive their rights to litigation.
In conclusion, the challenges in transforming our workplace into a productive environment free of gender disparities and sexual harassment are daunting.
The challenges to assuring that litigation and arbitration are effective ways to
stop sexual harassment are difficult. Hiding from our current predicament is no
help. Recognizing and understanding these challenges are essential to continuing progress.
AMM].
261
See Ward, supra note 260.
262
Id.
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See id.; Aidan F. Ryan, Harvard Law Students Push Major Firm to Drop Controversial
Contract Provisions, THE HARV. CRIMSON (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/art
icle/2018/11/26/kirkland-ellis-boycott/ [https://perma.cc/JA8U-ESTV].
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Assemb. B. 51, 2019 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (excluding any mandatory arbitration agreements agreed to prior to Jan. 1, 2020). The law’s viability, however, is being tested. In particular, there are questions about whether the law will be preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) which expressly endorses arbitration agreements. See Robert Carrol
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APPENDIX: SAMPLE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT PROVISIONS (COMPOSITE FROM
VARIOUS AGREEMENTS)
In consideration of my employment with this company and its promise to
arbitrate all disputes, I agree that, except as provided below, any and all past,
present, or future controversies, claims, or disputes between the company (or
any director, officer, agent, shareholder, employee) and me, including but not
limited to any disputes arising from my employment or termination of my employment (“Disputes”) will be subject to binding arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act.
Disputes include, but are not limited to, any federal or state statutory claim,
including but not limited to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and all
other civil rights statutes, claims of retaliation, harassment, discrimination, or
wrongful termination, and any other contractual, tort, or statutory claims to the
extent allowed by law.
I understand that, except as provided below, the company and I waive any
right to a judge or jury trial on any Dispute.
The arbitrator, and not any government court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any Dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability,
enforceability, voidability, or formation of this arbitration provision;
Arbitration Procedure. The Company and I agree that any arbitration will
be administered by [an arbitral institution such as the American Arbitration Associtaion] pursuant to its employee arbitration rules and procedures.
The arbitrator will have the power to decide motions prior to any arbitration hearing, the power to award any individual remedies available under applicable law including injunctive relief.
The arbitrator will apply the substantive law of the state in which the claim
arose, or federal law, or both, as applicable. The federal rules of evidence will
apply. The arbitrator will not have the authority to disregard or refuse to enforce any lawful company policy, not will require the company to adopt a policy not otherwise required by law.
The parties will each bear their own costs and fees, except that the arbitrator can apply cost and fee-shifting to the benefit of the prevailing party.
The arbitrator’s decision will be in writing and contain findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The arbitrator’s award may be entered as a final and binding judgment in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
Except as provided by law, the rules of the arbitral instituion, or this arbitration provision, arbitration will be the sole, exclusive, and final remedy for
any dispute between me and the company.

